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“Greeks and Turks have been condemned by 
History to learn how to co– exist” (Constantine 
Mitsotakis, Greek Prime Minister, Parliament 
speech on foreign policy, February 24, 1992).  
 
 
 
 
If we were asked to describe the relations between Greece and Turkey in a manner 
as comprehensive as possible then a good idea would be “a long history of unsolved 
problems”. The extent to which some or, maybe, even all of these problems would have 
been solved in the course of time, has remained an open issue offering ample room to 
what economists call “normative thinking” involving personal evaluations and value 
judgments. A representative sample of such normative thinking, can be easily traced 
during various media shows in Greece when a wide variety of “experts” are invited to 
support an even wider variety of opinions, presented as a rule, with a few notable 
exceptions, in the form of sweeping generalizations. It seems, at least according to the 
polls, that Greeks adore this kind of fruitless argument for the sake of argument. They 
even use a very descriptive term to refer to it as “conversation between deaf” to 
underline the chaotic atmosphere created by the panel members raising their voices to a 
stentorian level hoping that this will make their point of view more convincing. We 
suspect that the reason why the public adores such a show is simply because it seems 
that it is the best that the media can offer in terms of entertainment. 
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Joking apart, however, history has pointed out in more ways than one that the 
problems in the relations between Greece and Turkey are matters far too intricate to be 
treated as media shows. And the first thing one must do in order to appreciate the 
complexity of the relations between the two sides is to take a look at their historical 
background in the area. In fact, archaeology indicates that the roots of the Greek 
civilization in the Aegean date back to the Neolithic age (7000 to 6000 b.C.) its 
presence culminating during the prime of the Minoan and the subsequent Mycenaean 
civilization (since 1600 b.C.). By 500 b.C. all the islands in the Aegean and along the 
entire Asia Minor are inhabited by Greeks whose colonial expansion reaches as far as 
Syria and Italy. The Byzantine Empire has made the Greek presence in the area even 
stronger until its fall in May 1453, which started the Turkish occupation of Greece that 
lasted about 400 years. In fact the Turks who appeared in the region during the 11
th
 
century A.D. conquered the Greek mainland and the islands between 1456 and 1669. 
Greece had to wait until 1821 to resume its independence with the revolution in March 
of that year marking the revival of the Greek dominance in the area. All territorial 
disputes remaining were terminated by the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) while all 
Greeks were driven away from Asia Minor. Finally, the Treaty of Paris (February 10, 
1947) acknowledged Greek sovereignty on the Dodecanese isles thus raising the number 
of Greek islands to a total of 3,100 of which 2,463 are found in the Aegean inhabited by 
about 15% of the total Greek population. 
The case of Cyprus is equally interesting: The Greeks settled on the island during 
the 2nd millennium b.C. while the Persians conquered it in 540 b.C. and held it until 
330 b.C. when Alexander the Great put an end to the Persian rule of the island.  Cyprus 
was ruled by Alexander’s Ptolemy descendant dynasty until 30 b.C. Since then, and 
until 330 A.D. the island became a province of the Roman Empire and, later on, of the 
Byzantine Empire. After the fall of Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire took over 
Cyprus from the Venetians in 1571, only to cede it to Great Britain in 1878. In 1923, the 
Treaty of Lausanne formally acknowledged the British rule over Cyprus while Turkey 
renounced all claims on the island. In 1960 Cyprus was established as an independent 
Republic.  
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In both the Aegean and the Cyprus case, the status, as described above, has been 
under continuous challenge by Turkey since 1973, questioning, in particular, issues 
concerning the Greek F.I.R, the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea and the continental 
shelf of the islands. Concerning the case of Cyprus, moreover, the occupation of about 
40% of the island by Turkey since July 1974, following a coup aiming at overthrowing 
President Makarios, is rather unacceptable being, among other things, in direct conflict 
with the status of Cyprus as a full E.U. member since April 2003. In fact, it seems that 
the rapid developments with regard to the rapprochement of the Greek and the Turkish 
Cypriots after that date have revealed an intrinsic dynamism which may prove to be 
much more effective in terms of settling the Cyprus issue compared to all efforts 
undertaken thus far mainly by the U.N.  
In any case, however, and given their degree of complication, the Greek-Turkish 
relations and the Cyprus issue are problems the solution of which requires much more 
than just personal opinions and subjective evaluations. Those involved in such debates, 
be it discussants, experts or, even, decision-makers, remind of players trying to play 
football in the absence of an appropriate playing field. Their next option, of course, will 
be to play in the streets meaning that it is going to be a matter of time before the ball 
breaks the neighbor’s glass window or dirties the laundry drying in her backyard. 
Exchanging opinions can certainly be very useful provided that those involved agree on 
an objectively determined platform or framework that outlines the problem and provides 
the constraints within which they are allowed to apply their proposed solutions. In the 
absence of such a constraint such exchange of opinions and ideas is bound to remain 
fruitless and may even cause more trouble instead of contributing to settling the matter. 
The purpose of this book is to provide such a platform or framework that will 
describe the Cyprus problem as a major issue affecting the relations between Greece and 
Turkey and the arms race between the two countries. It is very important to point out, 
however, that solving the Cyprus issue is not exactly a prerequisite for settling all 
disputes between Greece and Turkey. The Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus 
problem must be regarded as being two very important, however entirely distinct issues. 
It goes without saying, however, that a mutually acceptable solution to the latter will 
contribute to the improvement of the former to a large extent. Going back to the 
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construction of our platform, what we have decided to do is to resort to the help of 
mathematics, always bearing in mind that they can be a useful servant, however a very 
bad master. In other words we have applied a number of mathematical techniques that 
have contributed just to the point at which the key determinants in this conflict are 
underlined thus offering a clear description of the relations between the two sides with 
emphasis on the issue of Cyprus. The picture thus obtained is then used for suggesting 
answers on a number of key questions, much more effectively, we believe, compared to 
the results of any panel discussion. In any case, however, the responsibility of the final 
decision concerning policies employed on such complicated issues certainly burdens the 
politicians’ shoulders. As far as we are concerned, we will be happy to know that the 
conclusions reached in this book are taken in consideration during the decision-making 
process in the interest of peace. After all, it is only natural to expect that it will require 
all the “intelligence” of our defence information systems in order to provide plausible 
answers to such crucial political and strategic issues.  
Irrespective of the importance of our contribution, however, one must always bear 
in mind that “computational intelligence is no match for natural stupidity”. In other 
words no matter how helpful the results of techniques of analysis may be their 
usefulness or otherwise can only be certified to the extent that the policy makers use 
them appropriately. We feel, however, that such a possibility is too good to be true. In 
fact, one cannot help but be disappointed by the way, in which politics for the sake of 
politics has disregarded national interests in Greece during the past. This is why when 
we first decided to write this book, we did so as a reaction to a feeling of regret that had 
overwhelmed us. Regret about the ignorance, superficiality and loss of values, 
indifference to national interests, demagogy and personal interests triumphing over 
national interests. The dominance of the former at the expense of the latter is crystal 
clear if one takes a look at the proceedings of the Parliament discussions on how to 
spend the leftovers of what used to be the 5-year procurement programme of the Greek 
armed forces. The main complaint of the opposition during that session focused not on 
the extent to which the purchase of a specific weapon would prove to be useful for the 
defence of the country, but, instead, on why the procurement had been assigned to dealer 
A rather than dealer B! We believe that this is more than enough to indicate complete 
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loss of sense of responsibility the consequences of which can be fatal to such an 
extreme, that no technical analysis could ever rectify.  
Given, however, that optimism has never hurt anyone we have decided to present 
our views on the Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem in this book. We 
would consider ourselves the happiest people on earth if our conclusions would 
contribute, even to a very small extent, to settling these intricate national issues.    
The first paper of the book aims at forecasting the burden on the Greek economy 
resulting from the arms race against Turkey. We employ alternatively the military debt 
or the defence share of GDP in order to approximate the measurement of such a burden, 
using artificial neural networks. The use of a wide variety of explanatory variables in 
combination with the promising results derived suggest that the pressure on the Greek 
economy resulting from this arms race is determined to a large extent by demographic 
factors which strongly favor the Turkish side. Prediction on both debt and expenditure 
exhibited highly satisfactory accuracy, while the estimation of input significance, has 
indicated that variables describing the Turkish side are often dominant over the 
corresponding Greek ones. 
The next paper proposes a measure of relative military security applicable to 
evaluating the impact of arms races on the security of alliance members. This measure is 
tailored to fit the case of Greece and Cyprus, on one hand, and Turkey on the other, in 
which demographic criteria play a dominant role. Once again, artificial neural networks 
were employed, this time trained to forecast the future behavior of relative security. The 
high forecasting performance permitted the application of alternative scenarios for 
predicting the impact of the Greek-Turkish arms race on the relative security of the 
Greek-Cypriot alliance.  
Professor Michael Vrahatis and Dr. Konstantine Parsopoulos of the University of 
Patras have contributed substantially in determining the optimal figure for defence 
expenditure, which is the scope of the third paper. What we do, more specifically in this 
case, is evaluate the optimal military expenditure for Greece and Cyprus compatible 
with the constraints imposed by the resources of their economies in the context of the 
Integrated Defence Doctrine. All experiments and scenarios examined using a special 
algorithm designed by the two experts lead to the conclusion that the current defence 
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burden of the two allies seems to be driving their economies beyond capacity limits. 
Reducing defence expenditure, however, seems prohibitive given the volatility of the 
current political circumstances. This means that the one-sided disarmament policy 
followed by Greece, since 2001 is a risky choice bearing in mind the long-term 
armament programmes pursued by Turkey, whose role in this arms race has been proven 
as leading.  
The same algorithm by Parsopoulos and Vrahatis has been used in the fourth paper 
to point out that the security benefit that Greece derives thanks to its alliance with 
Cyprus exceeds the corresponding Cypriot benefit by far. This conclusion is 
supplemented by pointing out that Cyprus is able to contribute to the alliance security 
more in terms of human resources. As regards Greece, its demographic weakness 
justifies its recent defence policy revision that emphasizes on quality, capital equipment 
and flexibility of forces in order to face the security requirements of the alliance and the 
increasing demands of its arms race against Turkey. 
A couple of words of caution may be necessary at this point: It is our firm belief 
that the disagreement as to the extent to which an arms race is indeed going on between 
Greece and Turkey (Brauer 2002 and 2003) is due, in most cases, to the shortcomings of 
the traditional techniques of analysis employed, as pointed out by Taylor (1995) and 
Kuo and Reitch (1995). We have, therefore, decided to resort to using advanced 
mathematical techniques to prove not only the existence of such a race, but also the 
causality direction that determines the side that takes the initiative in this race. More 
specifically, Chapter 1 employs the technique of artificial neural networks to establish 
the arms race between the two sides, as well as the various causal relationships between 
the variables involved. What Chapter 3 does, in addition, is to take a step further by 
calculating the optimal defence expenditure for the two allies, namely Greece and 
Cyprus. It will become clear during the analysis that the term “optimal” refers to the 
maximum defence burden allowed by the constraints imposed by the economy in each 
case and does not consider any non-economic restrictions related to geopolitical or 
strategic matters. While this optimal defence expenditure can be supported by the 
economy without any major redistribution problems, any defence increases over and 
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above this optimal level may be feasible only by shifting resources from non – defence 
to defence activities which can be taken to approximate the so called “peace dividend”.  
We are certain that the reader realizes the importance of these issues, especially 
when it comes to the arms race between Greece and Turkey, bearing in mind the adverse 
economic conditions prevailing in the economy of the latter in view of its request for a 
full EU membership. The $150 billion long term Turkish procurement programme, in 
particular, is expected to impose a disproportionally heavy burden on the country’s 
economy (Pavlopoulos 2000). The interesting part in this story refers to the substantial 
fraction of this sum representing the orders for the Turkish navy which requests, among 
other purchases, an aircraft and a helicopter carrier. Given that, according to the defence 
dogma of Turkey, the only possibility of a crisis requiring emphasis on naval warfare 
will involve Greece it is only straightforward to see the extent to which the allegation 
that we “presume the existence of an arms race between Greece and Turkey” in our 
research (Brauer 2003, page 29) is by all scientific standards simply wrong!   
The second important point concerns the objections we have faced with regard to 
referring to the Integrated Defence Doctrine as a form of alliance between Greece and 
Cyprus. In fact the spectrum of objections has been so wide that it starts by questionning 
our translation of the Greek “Ενιαίον Αμυντικόν Δόγμα”, claiming that the word 
“Joined” is more applicable than “Integrated”. The former, however, is much weaker, 
since the degree to which two parts may be joined may vary from a loose to a very tight 
extreme, while “integration” reflects exactly what “Ενιαίον” means: A complete 
unification. As regards the extent to which such an alliance exists, the answer is the 
following: There are very few sources in the literature describing the “de jure” structure 
of this alliance (Hellenic Ministry of Defence 2000), a thing that may justify, partly at 
least, the reluctance of this criticism to accept the Integrated Defence Doctrine. In its “de 
facto” form, however, this alliance has been fully operational for about twenty years or 
so despite the fact that its technical description reminds very little of what the standard 
Theory of Alliances dictates.        
After providing the necessary background describing the relations between Greece 
and Turkey with special reference to the arms race between them, we make use of a 
genetically evolved certainty neuron fuzzy cognitive map in order to forecast 
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developments concerning the Cyprus puzzle. What we do, in this case, in which Nicos 
Mateou has contributed substantially, is forecast the extent to which a settlement of the 
Cyprus issue may be possible given the decisions taken during the Copenhagen EU 
summit. We then consider the possibilities of an improvement in the Greek-Turkish 
relations which would, under certain conditions, lead to reducing the arms race between 
the two countries. The simulation exercises involve a number of scenarios examining 
the possible reactions of all sides involved in the Cyprus issue, namely Greece, Turkey, 
Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot community and the international environment. The results 
derived suggest that the Greek and the Cypriot side must not necessarily rely on the 
decisions taken during the Copenhagen summit conference with regard to the EU full 
accession of Cyprus. The forecasts point out, in addition, that the optimism of the Greek 
government concerning the outlook of its relations with Turkey and the subsequent 
reduction of the arms race against it is far from being justified. 
Concluding this introductory chapter we must point out that we have benefited a 
great deal by our discussions with Ambassador I. Bourloyannis and Professors M. 
Evriviades and P. Ifestos to whom we are indebted. Needless to say that we are 
responsible for any remaining errors as well as for the lack of any dose of diplomatic 
flavour, especially in the technical chapters. In fact the entire book reveals our 
preference for straightforward mathematical logic at the expense of diplomacy. Despite 
the fact that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the fact remains that this 
book addresses primarily decision - makers to whom we leave the task of translating our 
proposals into the language of diplomacy.  
 
 
 
 
June 2003 
A.S. Andreou and G.A. Zombanakis 
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Financial Versus Human Resources in the Greek-Turkish 
Arms Race: 
A Forecasting Investigation Using Artificial Neural Networks* 
By 
Andreas S. Andreou and George A. Zombanakis  
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Greek-Turkish conflict over a variety of strategic issues dates back several 
centuries, having entangled the two countries to the vicious cycle of a very expensive 
arms race (Kollias and Makrydakis, 1997). The aim of this paper is to forecast the 
pressure due to this arms race between Greece and Turkey exercised on the economy of 
the former. This forecast, established on the basis of the most appropriate explanatory 
variables, will provide the opportunity to comment on the nature and relative 
importance of the explanatory variables that determine the burden of this arms race on 
the Greek economy, as this is approximated by either the military debt of the country or 
the defence share of GDP. The method of analysis used is that of Artificial Neural 
Networks, which has been considered preferable to the conventional estimation methods 
for the purposes of the present analysis for reasons analyzed later on in this paper. 
It is well known that the cost of an arms race is the disturbance that the excessive 
military expenditure and the ensuing budgetary imbalances, bring about to the long-run 
economic growth of the countries involved, as these strive to maintain the balance of 
                                                          
* First published in “Defence and Peace Economics”, vol. 11, 4, 2000, pp. 403-426.   
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power between one another. The foreign sector of these countries, in particular, to the 
extent that these are characterized as small, open economies, is considerably burdened 
since military expenditure is highly import-demanding, crowding out funds intended for 
alternative, non-military uses, and leading to borrowing abroad in order to finance the 
military spending programmes. This foreign borrowing exerts an adverse impact on both 
the domestic and the foreign sector: on the former due to the slow-down of economic 
growth, as stated earlier, and on the latter because of the burden on the balance of 
payments, which causes the need for more borrowing, thus creating a vicious cycle of an 
ever-increasing foreign debt (Stavrinos and Zombanakis, 1998). The impact of the arms 
race with Turkey upon the Greek economy has been particularly painful since about 6% 
to 7% of the country's GDP is annually devoted to military expenditure. The military 
debt, moreover, has doubled within the decade of the 1990s to reach about 4 billion 
dollars at the end of 1997, representing roughly 15% of the total external debt of the 
country. Both these variables reflect the seriousness of the problem for the Greek 
economy. 
  
 
1.2 LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
Research seems to favor the military expenditure rather than the stock of the 
military debt as an indicator of the pressure exercised upon an economy due to an arms 
race, with only a few notable exceptions, like McWilliams (1987). A large number of 
papers have followed Benoit (1978), examining the effects of defence spending on 
growth, like Deger (1986) and, later on Ward et al. (1991), Buck et al. (1993), Looney 
(1994), as well as several authors in Hartley and Sandler (1990). 
Concentrating on the impact of an arms race on the balance of payments and the 
external debt of the countries that are involved in such a race, the only topic regarding 
the external sector which appears in the literature concerns the concentration of defence 
investment on the leading export sectors such as machinery and capital equipment, 
something which leads to reduction of the availability of exportable and the slowing 
down of economic growth.  Empirical research by Fontanel (1994), considers the 
independent variables that affect defence expenditure focusing on the impact of military 
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spending in the case of both developed and developing economies, while Levine and 
Smith (1997), concentrate on the role of military imports in an arms race between two 
countries. Specific reference to the case of Greece or to the Greek - Turkish conflict is 
found in Kollias (1994, 1995 and 1996) and Antonakis (1996 and 1997) who have 
investigated the economic effects of defence expenditure upon the Greek economy. 
The overwhelming majority of papers employ conventional estimation methods 
with the notable exception of Refenes et al. (1995) who have employed the artificial 
neural networks approach for determining the defence expenditure of Greece. The 
advantages of using the neural network facility are multiple and have been repeatedly 
analyzed in the literature (Kuo and Reitsch, 1995; Hill et. al., 1996). The ones that have 
attracted our attention for the solution of the specific problem are the following. First, 
the neural networks do not require an á-priori specification of the relationship between 
the variables involved. This is a major advantage in our case, since there is no such 
thing as an established theoretical background that describes the behavior of either the 
military expenditure or the military debt when these are affected by the independent 
variables chosen. There does not even seem to be an agreement as to which these 
variables are. Second, in cases like the present one, in which certain variables are 
correlated between one another and the pattern of behavior may be non-linear, the neural 
networks are more applicable. Finally, studies agree on the superiority of neural 
networks over conventional statistical methods concerning time-series forecasting. 
The main objective of this paper, therefore, as earlier stated, is to forecast the 
pressure that the arms race between Greece and Turkey exercises on the Greek economy 
and to indicate, with the help of the artificial neural networks technique, the selection of 
the most appropriate explanatory variables used in specifying such an “arms-race” 
function. We shall show, more specifically, that the explanatory variables best 
describing the behavior of the authorities and the reasoning behind such decisions are 
related to a large extent, to the population characteristics of the two countries, being, 
therefore, of a non-financial nature in its strict sense. Concentrating on such variables 
seems to be very interesting in the case of the Greek-Turkish conflict, since the 
comparison in terms of demographic developments is overwhelmingly against Greece. 
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The description of the technical background is presented in section 3. Section 4 
includes the presentation of the explanatory variables used as input in the analysis as 
well as the various scenarios considered. Section 5 describes the empirical results 
obtained, comparing them to those drawn on the basis of an OLS estimate. Finally 
section 6 sums up the conclusions drawn and evaluates the results. 
 
 
1.3 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
1.3.1 Neural Networks 
This section is devoted to describing the emerging technology of artificial neural 
networks. This technique belongs to a class of data driven approaches, as opposed to 
model driven approaches. The process of constructing such a “machine” based on 
available data is addressed by certain general-purpose algorithms. The problem is then 
reduced to the computation of the weights of a feed-forward network to accomplish a 
desired input-output mapping and can be viewed as a high dimensional, non-linear, 
system identification problem. In a feed-forward network, the units can be partitioned 
into layers, with links from each unit in the k
th
 layer being directed to each unit in the 
(k+1)
th
  layer. Inputs from the environment enter the first layer and outputs from the 
network are manifested at the last layer. An m-d-1 architecture is shown in Figure 1, 
which refers to a network with m inputs, d units in the hidden layer and one unit in the 
output layer. 
We use such m-d-1 networks to learn and then predict the behavior of the time-
series. The hidden and output layers realize a non-linear transfer function of the form: 
                    f y by( ) ( exp( ))   1 1                    (1) 
y w xi i
i
n



1
                          (2) 
where xi’s denote the input values of a node, while wi’s the real valued weights of edges 
incident on a node and n the number of inputs to the node from the previous layer. 
Equation (1) is known as the sigmoid function where b is the steepness. Also shown in 
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Figure 1 is a special node at the end of the input layer called “bias”. This node has a 
fixed input value of 1 and feeds into all the neurons in the hidden and the output layers, 
with adjustable weights as the other nodes. Its role is to represent the adjustable neuron 
threshold levels explicitly in the transfer function input. The nodal representation 
eliminates the need to treat threshold as a special neuron feature and leads to a more 
efficient algorithm implementation (Azoff, 1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of a Multi-Layer Perceptron feed-forward neural network 
architecture, with m input nodes, one bias input, d hidden nodes and one output node 
 
 
1.3.2 System Design 
From the given time series x={x(t): 1  t N} we obtain two sets: a training set  
xtrain={x(t):  1   t  T}, and a test set xtest={x(t): T < t  N}, where N is the length of the 
data series. The xtrain set is used to train the network at a certain level at which 
convergence is achieved based on some error criterion. This is done by presenting to the 
network L-times the sequence of inputs and desired outputs (L from now on will be 
referred to as epochs) and having the learning algorithm to adjust the weights in order to 
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minimize the diversion of the desired value from the predicted one. The network is 
asked to predict the next value in the time sequence, thus we have one output neuron.  
The range of values for the output neuron is limited to [0,1] by the implementation 
tool used, so the desired values di of both the training and the testing sets are normalized 
to this range just by taking the ratio di/dmax, in order to avoid negative values. Then, the 
output values oi predicted by the network can be easily restored by taking the inverse 
transformation oi* dmax. The training algorithm used is the well-known Error Back 
Propagation with a momentum term (see e.g. Rumelhart and McLelland, 1986; Azoff, 
1994). 
 
1.3.3 System Implementation, Training and Testing 
The system described above has been implemented using a neural network 
implementation tool, namely the Cortex-Pro Neural Networks Development System 
(Unistat, 1994). We used several alternative configuration schemes, as regards the 
number of hidden layers and the nodes within each layer, in order, first to achieve best 
performance and second, to facilitate comparison between different network 
architectures. The number of input neurons and the nature of data fed depend on what 
we call “scenarios”, that is, different cases in which, using some or all of the available 
input variables/factors, we attempt to forecast the performance of one specific variable 
not included in the input set. These scenarios will be presented in section 4. 
In each scenario, the desired values were normalized in the range [0,1] as stated 
earlier, while the learning and momentum coefficients (Rumelhart and McLelland, 
1986; Azoff, 1994) were kept constant at the positive values of 0.3 and 0.2 respectively.  
Every input variable is associated with one neuron in the input layer. Our data series 
consist of annual observations and the forecasting horizon was set to one step ahead. 
Determining the number of hidden layers and neurons in each layer can often be a very 
difficult task and possibly one of the major factors influencing the performance of the 
network. Too few neurons in a hidden layer may produce bias due to the constraint of 
the function space, which results to poor performance as the network embodies a very 
small portion of information presented. Too many neurons on the other hand may cause 
overfitting of data and increase considerably the amount of computational time needed 
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for the network to process data, something which will not necessarily lead to 
convergence. We therefore have used a variety of numbers of neurons within one hidden 
layer, while in some cases a two-hidden-layer scheme was also developed in order to 
investigate whether performance is improved. 
The number of iterations (epochs) presenting the whole pattern set during the 
learning phase is also very important. We have let this number vary during our 
simulations, since different network topologies, initial conditions and input sets, require 
different convergence and generalization times. The number of epochs our networks 
needed for convergence ranged between 3,000 and 10,000. One should be very cautious 
though when using a large number of epochs, as the network may overfit the data thus 
failing to generalize.  
The problems of bias and data overfitting mentioned above can be overcome by 
evaluating the performance of each network using a testing set of unseen patterns 
(testing phase). This set does not participate during the learning process (see e.g. Azoff, 
1994). If the network has actually learned the structure of the input series rather than 
memorizing it then it can perform well when the testing set is presented. Otherwise, if 
bias or overfitting is really the case, performance will be extremely poor on these “new” 
data values. Architecture selection is generally based on success during the testing 
phase, provided that the learning ability was satisfactory. 
Performance was evaluated using three different types of errors, specifically the 
Mean Absolute Error (MAE), the Least Mean Square Error (LMSE) and the Mean 
Relative Error (MRE). MAE shows the divergence between actual and predicted 
samples in absolute measures. LMSE is reported in order to have the error condition met 
by the Back Propagation algorithm. Finally, MRE shows the accuracy of predictions in 
percentage terms expressing it in a stricter way, since it focuses on the sample being 
predicted, not depending on the scale in which the data values are expressed or on the 
units of measurement used. Thus, we are able to estimate prediction error as a fraction 
of the actual value, this making the MRE the more objective error measure among the 
three used. LMSE, MAE and MRE are given by the following equations: 
LMSE  


1
2
2
1n
o di i
i
n
( )     (3) 
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

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n
     (4) 
MRE =
1
1n
o d
d
i i
ii
n 

     (5) 
where oi is the actual output of the network, di is the desired value when pattern i is 
presented and n is the total number of  patterns. 
An important aspect examined in the present analysis is the determination of the 
significance ordering of the variables involved, that is the selection of the variables 
which contribute more to the forecasting process. This task can be performed using the 
notions of input sensitivity analysis, described extensively in Refenes et. al. (1995) and 
Azoff (1994), based on which one can sum up the absolute values of the weights 
fanning from each input variable into all nodes in the successive hidden layer, thus 
estimating the overall connection strength of this variable. The input variables that have 
the highest connection strength can then be considered as most significant, in the sense 
of affecting the course of forecasting in a more pronounced way compared to others. 
Presenting the analytical technical background behind these notions is beyond the scope 
of this work, since the reader may refer to the sources stated above for further 
information. 
 
 
1.4 INPUT/OUTPUT VARIABLES AND SCENARIOS 
The data set used for the multiple simulations includes the 13 variables listed in 
Table 1, the sources of which are the Bank of Greece, the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, the Swedish International Peace Research Center and the United 
Nations Population Statistics. Variables A to F and variable Y consist of 36 
observations covering the period 1961-1996, while variables G to L consist of 35 
observations, up to and including 1995. 
 
Table 1. Variables, data and sources
 *
 
Code Data Series Source 
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A Rate of change of Greek GDP. Greek National Accounts  
B 
National investment of Greece as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Greek National Accounts  
C 
Military expenditure of Greece as a 
percentage of GDP. 
NATO, SIPRI (Swedish International 
Peace Research Institute) 
D 
Military expenditure of Turkey as a 
percentage of GDP. 
NATO, SIPRI 
E 
Non-oil civilian imports of Greece as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Bank of Greece 
F 
Non-oil military imports of Greece as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Bank of Greece 
G 
Greek defence expenditure per soldier 
(constant 1995 prices). 
IISS (International Institute of 
Strategic Studies-London) 
H 
Turkish defence expenditure per soldier 
(constant 1995 prices). 
IISS 
I Greek armed forces per 1000 people. IISS 
J Turkish armed forces per 1000 people. IISS 
K 
Percentage of the Greek population 
increase. 
U.N. Population Statistics 
L 
Percentage of the Turkish population 
increase. 
U.N. Population Statistics 
Y 
Rate of change of the Greek military 
debt. 
Bank of Greece 
*
Data series are available upon request 
 
 
 
Variable Y represents the rate of change of the military debt of Greece and shall be 
used as the dependent variable alternatively to variable C, which stands for the Greek 
defence share of GDP. The first set of explanatory variables representing the 
developments in resources characterized as of purely financial nature includes the 
following: Variable A is the rate of increase of the Greek real GDP, while B represents 
the aggregate national non-defence investment expenditure, both private and public, 
again as a percentage of GDP. Variables C and D stand for the GDP shares of defence 
expenditure in Greece and Turkey respectively, while variables E and F denote GDP 
shares of non-oil, non-defence imports and defence imports respectively.  
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The next set of independent variables has been selected to include those that place 
emphasis on human resources, mostly representing demographic features. Thus G and H 
stand for defence expenditure per soldier in Greece and Turkey respectively, while I and 
J denote percentage of armed forces in the population of Greece and Turkey. Finally, K 
and L indicate the population rate of increase in Greece and Turkey respectively.    
Using these variables we formed three scenarios, which will be simulated and 
evaluated:  
(i) Financial Resources Scenario, which assumes that the Greek GDP share of 
defence expenditure or, alternatively, the increase of the stock of military debt 
is determined by variables representing financial resources of the two countries 
involved in the arms race as these are described chiefly by national accounts 
items. The choice of such variables is based on the selection of the variables 
that seem to perform better in the literature cited earlier on in this paper.  
(ii) Human Resources Scenario, which considers the Greek defence share of GDP 
or, alternatively, the increase of the stock of military debt as determined by the 
population characteristics of the two countries involved, rather than the 
financial resources of the respective sides. Emphasizing on such factors does 
not seem to be the case, at least as far as we know, in the relevant literature and 
it is therefore interesting to see the extent to which the population factor may 
affect the arms race of the countries involved.  
(iii) Composite Scenario, created by the combination of those variables in the first 
two scenarios that have been found to be the most significant using input 
sensitivity analysis. Table 4 (top four rows – see subsection 5.2) presents a 
comprehensive summary of the first two scenarios, as regards the specification 
of input and output variables of a neural network, with each scenario including 
two alternative cases using either the Greek defence share of GDP or the rate of 
change of the stock of military debt as an output variable. 
Our primary goals when formulating these scenarios have been, first to determine 
the predictive ability of neural networks in the context of an arms-race scenario and 
second to select those explanatory variables that yield the best forecasting performance. 
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1.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The training sets of the Financial Resources Scenario consist of 29 annual 
observations, covering the period 1961-1989 and those of the Human Resources 
Scenario of 28, representing the period 1961-1988. The testing sets, in all scenarios, 
consist of 7 annual samples, referring to the period 1990-1996 for the former scenario, 
while this period is shorter by one observation, that is, 1989-1995, for the latter. The 
results obtained for each scenario are analyzed in the following section.  
 
1.5.1 Comparison Between Two Scenarios: Financial vs. Human Resources   
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the best results obtained in the context of both scenarios 
providing for the evaluation of the training as well as the testing phase, in cases in 
which the arms race pressure is approximated either by the change of the stock of 
military debt or the defence share of GDP. 
It is clear that using the latter as a dependent variable yields much better results in 
terms of predictive ability of the networks in both scenarios, with all error figures for the 
testing phase of all networks being slightly superior for the financial resources scenario. 
The best performance yielded a 93% success against 84% for the human resources 
scenario in MRE terms. 
The corresponding network performance when the stock of military debt is used as 
a dependent variable is rather inferior in terms of all error evaluation figures. In MRE 
terms the testing phase exhibited 70% and 52% highest prediction success for the 
financial and human resources scenarios respectively. It is interesting to point out, as a 
general remark, that when the number of hidden layers and nodes within each layer is 
increased, providing for a more complex topology, the time needed for the network to 
converge, as this is expressed in terms of number of epochs, is reduced to approximately 
half the training time of the simple architectures.  
 
 
Table 2.  Prediction results: Financial Resources scenario, Debt and Expenditure cases 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
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  Training Phase Testing Phase 
Network
*
 Epochs MAE LMSE MRE MAE LMSE MRE 
 
 
Inputs: 
Debt 
A, B, C, D, E, F 
Case  
Output: 
 
Y 
 
6-4-1 10,000 
0.05842 
(0.0114) 
0.00347 
(0.0015) 
0.091 
(0.0191) 
0.20003 
(0.0487) 
0.02710 
(0.0106) 
0.295 
(0.0811) 
6-8-1 10,000 
0.04259 
(0.0102) 
0.00212 
(0.0014) 
0.064 
(0.0101) 
0.30147 
(0.0761) 
0.05593 
(0.0166) 
0.301 
(0.0822) 
6-8-4-1 5,000 
0.05337 
(0.0109) 
0.00311 
(0.0015) 
0.080 
(0.0145) 
0.2301 
(0.0585) 
0.0368 
(0.0146) 
0.318 
(0.0854) 
6-32-16-1 6,000 
0.06979 
(0.0071) 
0.00533 
(0.0004) 
0.098 
(0.0121) 
0.18330 
(0.0281) 
0.02329 
(0.0041) 
0.288 
(0.0400) 
 
 
Inputs: 
Expenditure 
A, B, Y, D, E, F 
Case  
Output: 
 
C 
 
6-4-1 5,000 
0.04334 
(0.0064) 
0.00148 
(0.0040) 
0.059 
(0.0110) 
0.09570 
(0.0215) 
0.00596 
(0.0022) 
0.124 
(0.0279) 
6-8-1 3,000 
0.03130 
(0.0048) 
0.00080 
(0.0003) 
0.031 
(0.0061) 
0.05413 
(0.0052) 
0.00248 
(0.0009) 
0.087 
(0.0065) 
6-8-4-1 3,000 
0.0579 
(0.0115) 
0.00350 
(0.0018) 
0.085 
(0.0200) 
0.06061 
(0.0196) 
0.00311 
(0.0020) 
0.089 
(0.0196) 
*
 “m-d-n” stands for m input nodes, d nodes in the hidden layer and n output nodes. 
“m-d-p-n” stands for m input nodes, d nodes in the first hidden layer, p nodes in   the second hidden 
layer and n output nodes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 presents graphically the course of forecasting of stock of military debt in 
(a) and the defence share of GDP in (b), for the financial scenario that yielded the best 
predictive performance. As stated earlier, based on the error measures, the latter appears 
to have higher predictive ability compared to the former. The two variables apparently 
have different variances, thus we have calculated the correlation coefficient between 
actual and predicted samples in order to eliminate the possibility the results are 
numerical artifacts. Indeed this enhanced our results, as the correlation coefficient for 
the training phase was 0.86 for the debt case and 0.98 for the expenditure one, while for 
the testing phase 0.80 for the former and 0.87 for the latter. 
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Table 3.  Prediction results: Human Resources scenario, Debt and Expenditure cases (standard 
errors in parentheses) 
  Training Phase Testing Phase 
Network
*
 Epochs MAE LMSE MRE MAE LMSE MRE 
  
Inputs: 
Debt  
G, H, I, J, K, L 
Case  
Output: 
 
Y 
 
6-4-1 10.000 0.04548 
(0.0097) 
0.00236 
(0.00090) 
0.060 
(0.0143) 
0.20985 
(0.0654) 
0.03483 
(0.0133) 
0.537 
(0.2068) 
6-8-1 8.000 0.04411 
(0.0088) 
0.00226 
(0.00070) 
0.058 
(0.0125) 
0.30073 
(0.0537) 
0.05386 
(0.0187) 
0.610 
(0.0901) 
6-8-4-1 5.000 0.04303 
(0.0093) 
0.00218 
(0.00080) 
0.056 
(0.0132) 
0.20729 
(0.0383) 
0.02587 
(0.0092) 
0.487 
(0.1298) 
6-32-16-1 8.000 0.01414 
(0.0023) 
0.00021 
(0.00005) 
0.017 
(0.0038) 
0.31205 
(0.0714) 
0.06403 
(0.0231) 
0.657 
(0.0728) 
  
Inputs: 
Expenditure  
G, H, I, J, K, L 
Case  
Output: 
 
C 
 
6-4-1 5,000 0.03660 
(0.0035) 
0.00083 
(0.00010) 
0.049 
(0.0049) 
0.16086 
(0.0091) 
0.01318 
(0.0013) 
0.205 
(0.0135) 
6-8-1 3,000 0.02100 
(0.0029) 
0.00034 
(0.00008) 
0.027 
(0.0047) 
0.12362 
(0.0166) 
0.00846 
(0.0022) 
0.159 
(0.0226) 
6-8-4-1 3,000 0.03816 
(0.0035) 
0.00089 
(0.00012) 
0.051 
(0.0049) 
0.16227 
(0.0091) 
0.01341 
(0.0014) 
0.207 
(0.0135) 
*
 “m-d-n” stands for m input nodes, d nodes in the hidden layer and n output nodes. 
“m-d-p-n” stands for m input nodes, d nodes in the first hidden layer, p nodes in the second hidden layer 
and n output nodes. 
 
 
1.5.2 Estimation of Input Significance 
The input significance ordering is a procedure most interesting for the purposes of 
the present paper, since it serves a twin purpose.   
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(a) Debt Case, 6-32-16-1 neural network topology 
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(b) Expenditure Case, 6-8-1 neural network topology 
Figure 2. Neural networks prediction results on Financial Scenario: (a) Greek Military Debt 
and (b) Greek Defence Expenditure. Actual values are plotted versus forecasted outputs. In-
sample corresponds to the learning period, while out-of-sample to the evaluation period. 
 
 
First, it involves determining the most significant input variables in terms of 
explanatory power in the two scenarios considered thus far. This hierarchy ordering is 
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based on the forecasting performance of these variables on both the rate of change of the 
stock of military debt and the Greek defence share of GDP, and leads to building the 
composite scenario. Second, the selection of the most significant variables is expected 
to lead to interesting conclusions concerning their nature and their role in determining 
the pressure of the arms race on the Greek economy. 
 
1.5.2.1  Financial Resources Results:   
Debt Case  
The ranking showed that all networks, regardless the number of nodes or hidden 
layers, exhibited the same significance order: wD>wC>wF, with the remaining variables 
having very low strengths. It is interesting to see, therefore, that the Turkish GDP share 
of military expenditure is the leading determinant of the Greek external military debt, its 
weight being by far the largest, almost double that of each of the rest two, the weights of 
which are almost equal. This finding supports the view in favor of the existence of an 
arms race between the two rival countries and underlines the pressure that this arms race 
exercises on the Greek economy. The second variable in terms of significance is the 
Greek defence share of GDP, while the Greek import bill on military equipment comes 
third in significance ordering.  
Expenditure Case  
The determination of the significant input variables according to their weights 
summation provided the same ordering for all networks: wF>wY>wD. This result has 
been, to a large extent, expected. The selection of the determinants is essentially the 
same as in the previous case, with only the ordering being reversed. It is, therefore, the 
expenditure on military imports that plays the dominant role in determining the Greek 
GDP share of defence spending, a dominance being by far the most pronounced 
compared to the rest two explanatory variables, (i.e. the change of the Greek military 
external debt and the Turkish GDP share of defence spending, as indicated by the 
comparison of the relevant weights). This rearrangement of the order of significance, in 
this case, reinforces the conclusions already derived in the debt case. The pressure 
exercised from the part of the Turkish side is always dominant expressed by the 
presence of this country’s defence share of GDP as one of the leading determinants of 
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the Greek corresponding share. The importance of the military debt as the second 
leading variable determining the Greek defence spending simply shows a reversal of 
roles in terms of causality direction between the two variables with reference to the case 
of military debt determination and supports earlier work on the topic examining the 
vicious cycle between defence expenditure and military debt (Stavrinos and 
Zombanakis, 1998). 
 
1.5.2.2. Human Resources Results 
Debt Case  
Determining the military debt along the lines of the Human Resources scenario 
indicates that the Greek defence expenditure per soldier, the rate of increase of the 
Greek population and the proportion of armed forces in the population of Turkey are the 
leading explanatory variables in that order (wG>wK>wJ). The weights of the first two 
independent variables are almost equal, something that does not allow for a clear-cut 
determination of the ordering of importance between them. Again, however, a variable 
representing the resources of the “other side” is strongly present among the leading 
determinants of the Greek external military debt, only to support, once more, the 
existence of an arms race environment. 
Expenditure Case  
This case is unique in the sense that it is the only one in which variables describing 
the Turkish side are not among the leading determinants of the pressure on the Greek 
economy due to this arms race. The weight ranking resulted the order wG>wI>wK. Thus, 
the Greek GDP share of military expenditure is determined chiefly by the Greek defence 
spending per soldier, which this time, appears to be the leading determinant by far, to be 
followed by the proportion of armed forces in the Greek population and the rate of 
increase of the population in the country.    
 
1.5.3 Composite Scenario  
The preceding Input Significance Analysis leads us to making the main point of the 
present paper in terms of what we refer to as “the Composite Scenario”. This involves 
combining the three most significant inputs of each of the two scenarios earlier 
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examined, namely the Financial Resources and the Human Resources ones. These input 
variables have been selected on the basis of the input sensitivity ordering indicated in 
Table 4 (top four rows). The training and testing sets of this scenario have the same data 
length as those in the Human Resources Scenario. 
 
 
Table 4. Leading determinants for each scenario based on Input Sensitivity Analysis 
Scenario Case Study Leading Determinants
*
 Output 
Financial 
Debt WD>WC>WF Y 
Resources  Expenditure WF>WY>WD C 
Human 
Debt WG>WK>WJ Y 
Resources  Expenditure WG>WI>WK C 
Composite 
Debt WK>WJ>WG Y 
Resources  Expenditure WG>WI>WD C 
*
WN denotes the sum of the absolute values of the weights of the Nth input variable node 
connections. 
 
 
1.5.3.1. Results 
Debt Case  
Various network topologies have been developed in the context of the Composite 
Scenario trained using C, D, F, G, J and K as input variables and over a variety of 
iterations numbers. Table 5 (top half) summarizes the best results obtained when 
forecasting the Y variable and provides for an evaluation of both the training and testing 
phase in the case in which the burden of the arms race for the Greek economy is 
approximated by the military debt. 
The interesting result in this scenario has to do with both the nature of the variables 
selected as well as their explanatory power. We see that the network performance is 
almost equally successful compared with the best results obtained in cases of debt 
determination in the previous two scenarios. In fact, the errors derived in the testing 
28                   A.S. Andreou and G.A. Zombanakis  
 
phase are very close to those in the corresponding case of the Financial Resources 
Scenario and considerably lower compared to the errors of the debt determination case 
of the Human Resources Scenario. Thus the MREs indicated a roughly 70% prediction 
success for the 6-8-4-1 topology that performed best, denoting that the new set of input 
variables performs as successfully as it did in the case of the Financial Resources 
Scenario in forecasting the military external debt.  
 
 
Table 5.  Prediction results: Composite scenario, Debt and Expenditure cases 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
  Training Phase Testing Phase 
Network
*
 Epochs MAE LMSE MRE MAE LMSE MRE 
  
Inputs: 
Debt  
C, D, F, G, J, K 
Case  
Output: 
 
Y 
 
6-4-1 10.000 0.04074 
(0.0120) 
0.00290 
(0.0016) 
0.058 
(0.0154) 
0.19735 
(0.0594) 
0.03006 
(0.0136) 
0.539 
(0.2228) 
6-8-1 10.000 0.02262 
(0.0044) 
0.00059 
(0.0002) 
0.033 
(0.0065) 
0.25300 
(0.0615) 
0.04335 
(0.0183) 
0.496 
(0.0932) 
6-8-4-1 5.000 0.02221 
(0.0043) 
0.00052 
(0.0001) 
0.029 
(0.0066) 
0.15384 
(0.0368) 
0.01589 
(0.0060) 
0.306 
(0.0755) 
6-32-16-1 6.000 0.02086 
(0.0040) 
0.00047 
(0.0001) 
0.031 
(0.0067) 
0.17177 
(0.0479) 
0.02163 
(0.0099) 
0.328 
(0.0820) 
  
Inputs: 
Expenditure  
Y, D, F, G, I, K  
Case  
Output: 
 
C 
 
6-4-1 5,000 0.03014 
(0.0039) 
0.00066 
(0.0001) 
0.040 
(0.0051) 
0.14329 
(0.0187) 
0.01131 
(0.0022) 
0.182 
(0.0258) 
6-8-1 3,000 0.02350 
(0.0033) 
0.00043 
(0.0001) 
0.033 
(0.0050) 
0.09336 
(0.0166) 
0.00518 
(0.0013) 
0.119 
(0.0222) 
6-8-4-1 3,000 0.02605 
(0.0029) 
0.00048 
(0.0001) 
0.037 
(0.0045) 
0.09964 
(0.0179) 
0.00592 
(0.0015) 
0.127 
(0.0239) 
*
 “m-d-n” stands for m input nodes, d nodes in the hidden layer and n output nodes. 
“m-d-p-n” stands for m input nodes, d nodes in the first hidden layer, p nodes in the second hidden 
layer and n output nodes. 
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Expenditure Case 
The final simulation employs variables Y, D, F, G, I and K, found to be more 
significant by input sensitivity analysis, to forecast variable C, the defence share of 
GDPs in Greece. The results obtained here and summarized in Table 5 (bottom half), 
being similar to those in the previous case.  
All networks provided for a very satisfactory performance, the testing phase errors 
being very close to those in the corresponding case of the Financial Resources scenario. 
The best topology is the 6-8-1 architecture with a prediction success of approximately 
88% (MRE terms).  
 
1.5.3.2  Estimation of Input Significance 
The Input Significance exercise has been performed on the basis of the results 
obtained in the case of the Composite scenario along the lines of section 5.2. Its findings 
are summarized in Table 4 (bottom two rows) and they seem to be very interesting since 
they provide a full picture as to whether and the extent to which human resources may 
account for the development of the military debt or the Greek share of GDP expenditure, 
thus illustrating a number of very important points. 
Debt Case  
As regards the question of determining the military external debt of Greece, the rate 
of the Greek population increase, a Human Resources indicator, seems to be almost 
twice more powerful compared to the other explanatory variables, the explanatory 
power measured by the relevant weight computed. Equally interesting is the fact that the 
second in order of importance determinant is another Human Resources indicator, this 
time, however, concerning the “opposite side”, the proportion of the armed forces in the 
population of Turkey. Finally, the Greek military expenditure per soldier comes third in 
terms of explanatory power in this case. It is worth noting, finally, that the top three 
determinants in this case are the same as the top three ones in the corresponding Human 
Resources case, but in a different order. 
Expenditure Case 
In the case in which the Greek GDP share of defence spending is taken to 
approximate the arms-race pressure on the Greek economy, the Greek defence 
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expenditure per soldier is now the leading explanatory variable. The proportion of 
armed forces in the Greek population comes second in explanatory power, while the 
GDP share of military expenditure in Turkey is third in importance. It is interesting to 
see, therefore, that the first two independent variables are derived from the Human 
Resources Scenario while the third one that is not, represents the “Other side”, 
underlining once more the dominant influence of the Turkish side on the defence burden 
of Greece.  
 
1.5.4 Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
Concluding this analysis, we thought that it would be interesting to investigate the 
extent to which our neural network topologies are suitable for forecasting the arms-race 
pressure on the Greek economy better than a conventional OLS exercise, using the same 
explanatory variables. 
We tried OLS regressions with the dependent variable being the rate of change of 
the military external debt and, alternatively, the Greek defence share of GDP, for all 
three scenarios used. All series have been found to be stationary in their first 
differences, on the basis of the ADF test. Due to the small number of available 
observations, the OLS has been performed using the entire sample period, (i.e. 1961-
1996, while the forecasting period involves the last seven years, the forecasting period 
of the corresponding neural networks exercise). The estimation results for all equations 
are presented in Table 6, with t-values indicated in parentheses and the variable res 
denoting the residuals of the corresponding long-run estimates. The results are 
satisfactory, bearing the expected signs. The ambiguity of the sign concerning the rate of 
the Greek population increase is expected. One may argue that a high rate of population 
growth will lead to increasing manpower in most units and therefore, the requirements 
for more equipment. An opposing view, however, appears to interpret recent 
developments in the Greek armed forces in a different way: The demands of modern 
warfare call for small, flexible units, very well trained and equipped with high 
technology weapons. In face of the slowing down of the Greek population growth this 
calls for a heavier arms race burden in order to finance this shift to the modernization of 
the armed forces of the country.  
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Table 6. OLS regression results on Military Debt and Defence Expenditure 
(t-values in parentheses) 
Financial Resources 
Scenario 
Human Resources Scenario Composite Scenario 
Varia-
bles 
Debt 
Expen-
diture 
Varia-
bles 
Debt 
Expen-
diture 
Varia-
bles 
Debt 
Expen-
diture 
Const. 
-0.04 
(-0.76) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Const. 
-0.02 
(-0.29) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
Const. 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
A 
0.44 
(0.47) 
4.39 
(4.82) 
G 
0.05 
(2.90) 
0.15 
(5.07) 
D 
0.07 
(0.84) 
0.22 
(1.85) 
B 
-3.09 
(-1.21) 
-4.99 
(-1.90) 
H 
0.13 
(2.03) 
0.10 
(1.02) 
F 
0.47 
(3.05) 
0.09 
(0.38) 
C 
0.11 
(1.53) 
 I 
0.14 
(2.46) 
0.42 
(3.36) 
Y  
0.12 
(0.72) 
D 
0.09 
(1.20) 
0.26 
(2.94) 
J 
0.10 
(2.26) 
0.18 
(2.10) 
G 
0.05 
(2.78) 
0.12 
(4.51) 
E 
7.88 
(2.80) 
0.34 
(0.13) 
K 
-0.13 
(-3.12) 
0.19 
(2.61) 
K 
-0.09 
(-2.47) 
0.10 
(1.77) 
F 
0.30 
(1.91) 
0.21 
(1.30) 
L 
0.07 
(1.83) 
0.15 
(1.98) 
I  
0.19 
(2.58) 
Y  
0.21 
(1.69) 
   J 
0.10 
(2.07) 
 
      C 
0.03 
(0.52) 
 
res(-1) 
-1.39 
(-7.22) 
-1.27 
(-10.22) 
res(-1) 
-1.35 
(-5.93) 
-0.94 
(-4.24) 
res(-1) 
-1.27 
(-7.12) 
-1.23 
(-6.31) 
R
2
 0.78 0.90 R
2
 0.76 0.75 R
2
 0.81 0.81 
D.W. 1.97 1.55 D.W. 2.14 2.04 D.W. 2.40 1.88 
 
 
 
To the extent that one may comment on the hierarchy ordering of the leading 
determinants taking the t-statistic as a measure, it seems that in the debt case, the OLS 
ordering coincides with that of the neural networks in the qualification of two out of 
three major determinants, namely the Greek defence expenditure per soldier and the 
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percentage of Greek population increase. In the expenditure case, the ordering indicated 
by the OLS exercise shows a remarkable coincidence to that given by the neural 
networks, since they both agree on the qualification of the top three explanatory 
variables in the same order of importance. 
The results of the forecasts using the OLS regressions are shown in Table 7. 
Forecasting performance does not exceed the accuracy of 65% for the debt case and 
45% for the expenditures case (testing phases) based on MRE terms, suggesting that 
almost all neural networks topologies performed better than the OLS. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Ordinary least squares prediction errors 
  Overall Period Period of testing
*
 
Scenario Case MAE LMSE MRE MAE LMSE MRE 
Financial Debt 0.154 0.024 0.912 0.221 0.046 0.409 
Resources Expenditure 0.223 0.031 0.862 0.219 0.037 0.629 
Human Debt 0.165 0.032 0.923 0.175 0.035 0.363 
Resources Expenditure 0.287 0.096 0.727 0.318 0.099 0.862 
Composite Debt 0.152 0.023 0.749 0.192 0.031 0.806 
 Expenditure 0.228 0.066 0.521 0.241 0.067 0.543 
*
 This period corresponds to the one used as a testing phase for the neural networks. 
 
 
 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 The arms race that has been going on between Greece and Turkey for a long period 
of time has become the cause of a considerable pressure on the economies of the two 
countries. This paper has demonstrated that, apart from the financial aspect of the 
problem, there is another dimension that of the human resources, which is at least 
equally important to the financial resources aspect in determining the arms race load 
imposed on the Greek economy. The demographic developments in the two countries, to 
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be more specific, have been proven to exercise significant explanatory power, affecting 
the decisions of the Greek authorities on adding to the already heavy burden of the arms 
race on the economy of Greece. This analysis has thus led to deriving certain interesting 
conclusions: 
i. The neural networks methodology employed has attained a very satisfactory 
prediction level for the arms race pressure imposed on the Greek Economy, as 
this is proxied by both the change of the military debt and the defence share of 
GDP. This prediction performance is superior to that attained using 
corresponding OLS estimations in all cases. 
ii. In the context of the so-called “composite scenario”, in which both financial and 
human resources variables have been included, the latter are dominant over the 
former in determining and forecasting the burden of an arms race on the Greek 
Economy, as this is approximated by either the military debt or the defence share 
of GDP. 
iii. In all scenarios and cases tried, variables representing or approximating the 
Turkish side are among the dominant ones in determining the pressure due to 
this arms race on the Greek economy. The input sensitivity analysis proves that 
one of the top three variables determining this pressure represents the “opposite 
side” in all cases, either in financial resources terms (defence share of GDP) or 
in human resources terms (proportion of armed forces in the population). The 
former is indeed one of the top determinants in terms of sensitivity in almost all 
scenarios. This finding verifies and underlines the fact that the pressure exercised 
on the Greek economy by this arms race will be very difficult to mitigate since it 
is to a considerable extent exogenous, depending on the policy followed by the 
“opposite side”. 
iv. Combining the above two conclusions leads to suggesting that in the context of 
the Greek-Turkish arms race, the human resources factor deserves more attention 
than what it has been given in the literature thus far. Demographic developments 
in the two countries, provide for a serious disadvantage for the Greek side, since 
its population, unlike that of Turkey, is aging, increasing at very low rates, 
which, on certain occasions, have even turned negative during the recent past. 
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These developments, combined with pronounced differences as regards the 
standard of living between the two countries have made the need for expansion 
of what is termed “vital space”, more than demanding for the Turkish side. The 
Greek side, in its turn, aiming at facing this dynamism from the part of its 
neighbor, and bearing in mind its disadvantages as regards human resources 
developments, has turned to improving the efficiency of its armed forces, placing 
emphasis on their flexibility and speed of reaction, as well as on the quality of 
the equipment and technology used. This policy, in its turn, demands either 
buying the latest version of equipment or upgrading the quality and efficiency of 
items already in use. The so-called “purchase of the century”, involving placing 
an order for a large number of highly qualified military aircraft during the mid - 
eighties has been just the beginning of a series of structural reform measures 
towards this direction. The problem in this case, as earlier stated, is that Greece, 
facing a binding and prohibitive domestic supply constraint concerning its 
defence industry, is compelled to resort to importing expensive, high - 
technology equipment, thus increasing, not only its defence expenditure but also 
its debt burden. It seems therefore interesting to suggest that future research 
should be directed towards the trade - off between capital and human resources 
as an additional determinant affecting the future course of the Greek - Turkish 
arms race. 
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